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3DETERMINANTS OF THE INFLUENCE OF VOTERS AND IN-
TEREST GROUPS ON THE POLITICAL DECISION
MAKING PROCESS
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical model of the political decision making proc-
ess. Therein two ideologically different political parties compete for power. Their primary in-
strument in this competition are programmatic concessions in favor of voters and interest
groups. As any concession causes losses in utility for the party members, the parties try to
win the election with as little concessions as possible. The efficient amount of concessions
and their distribution on different groups of voters and interest groups is derived. These con-
cessions are taken as an indicator for the influence of these two groups of political agents on
the political decision making process. Hence the political model developed in this paper
helps to determine the political influence of voters and interest groups. The illustrations show
that the efficient amount of concessions depends on the closeness of the election race. The
closer the initial distribution of votes, the more concessions can voters and interest groups
wring from the political parties. The characteristics of the political landscape, e.g. the share of
informed voters and the degree of ideological polarization, are found to determine the effi-
cient amount of concessions and thus the influence of voters and interest groups on the po-
litical decision making process.
Key words: Public Choice, theory, voters, interest groups, election
JEL: D 72
41. Introduction
There is a broad consensus among scientists that voters, politicians and interest
groups are the primary agents in the political decision making process. At the same time, the
degree to which the results of this process follows the preferences of these different agents
is controversially discussed. The wide dispersion of answers results from the fact that the
numerous theoretical and empirical articles on this topic differ in their primary focus. Most of
the articles focus on only two of the three groups of agents named above. They describe
their characteristics and structure and provide insight into the process and results of their
interaction. So far there is still a shortage in theoretical models that incorporate all three
groups and at the same time account for their main structural characteristics.
This paper combines a number of existing approaches (especially Denzau and
Munger, 1986, Coughlin et al., 1990, Congleton, 1991, Mueller and Stratmann, 1994,
Grossman and Helpman, 1996) and adds some new elements in order to develop a more
comprehensive model of the political decision making process. It places two political parties
as primary agents in the centre of the analysis. Their aims and characteristics are shortly
reviewed in section 2. In their struggle for power, they make programmatic concessions and
engage in campaigning in order to manipulate the other agents involved in the political proc-
ess. The voters are the first addressees of their activities. Section 3 characterizes this group
of political agents and shows how it can be divided into different target groups. Assuming
that both parties use their instruments efficiently, first conclusions about how a political party
will distribute its campaigning effort and concessions across these different target groups are
drawn. Section 4 introduces interest groups and shows how different types of interest groups
are courted by the political parties. The fifth section combines the major findings from the
previous passages and models the parties’ competition for power in a game-theoretic model.
By deriving and analysing possible political equilibria, first answers to two questions are
given: First, how much concessions are the political parties forced to make in their election
campaign? Second, who are the beneficiaries of these concessions and to what extend do
they benefit? The answers to these questions can help to draw conclusions about the original
focus of this paper, i.e. the extent to which the results of the political decision making process
follow the preferences of voters and interest groups. The more concessions a political party
has to make, the less political influence does it have. The influence of interest groups of vot-
ers increases with the extent of concessions they can wring from the political parties. Based
on the theoretical considerations in the preceding sections, section 6 shows how the political
influence of voters and interest groups is changed when the characteristics of the political
landscape change.
52. Politicians and political parties
In most democracies, especially in Europe, the political competition is primarily car-
ried out by political parties rather than by individual politicians. In this paper, it is assumed
that only two parties compete for power. Each party will be interpreted as a sort of enterprise
that tries to maximize the utility of its members, especially the candidates (e.g. Galeotti and
Bretton, 1986, Jones and Hudson, 1998). As the utility of an individual candidate depends
largely on his income, prestige and power, the primary party aim is to achieve political posts
for as many of its candidates as possible. The number of available posts is especially high if
the party wins the election and is allowed to fill positions in the government and top bureauc-
racy. Hence it can be assumed that the primary aim of a political party is to win the election
by attracting the majority of votes.
A secondary political aim of every party concerns the political decisions its members
want to put through once they are in power. These decisions are proclaimed in the party pro-
gramme. In this paper, each party P is assumed to have an ideal party programme PRGP*. It
represents the aggregated political preferences of the party members and candidates. Em-
pirical observations especially from Europe suggest that existing political parties differ in ide-
ology and consequently in their party programme (e.g. Klingemann and Volkens, 1997: 532-
533). This difference is stabilized by the fact that an individual who wants to become a politi-
cian will choose the party whose political ideology comes closest to his own beliefs. First, this
makes it more likely for him to get nominated. Second, once in power, he and his fellow party
members can use the political power to change the institutional settings within the society
according to their own ideological preferences. As empirical studies show, this possibility
represents a strong motivation for politicians (Kalt and Zupan, 1984: 281-282, Kalt and Zu-
pan, 1990: 104, Bronars and Lott, 1997: 320-346). Therefore the more of PRGP* the winning
party can put through after the election, the higher the utility of the party members and can-
didates.
In the competition for this majority, it is in most cases necessary for a political party to
offer a programme PGRP that deviates from PGRP* (Coughlin et. al., 1990: 685-686). The
difference is due to concessions that the party makes in favor of different groups of voters
and interest groups in exchange for additional votes (Denzau and Munger, 1986: 92-93,
Grossman and Helpman, 1996: 278-279). The fact that a party can only put through its own
positions if it is in power constitutes a clear hierarchy of aims. The primary objective is to win
the election. As the deviations from PRGP* lead to losses in utility among the party candi-
dates, every party will try to reach political power with as few deviations as possible. A ra-
tional party can thus be expected to use the instrument of programmatic concessions effi-
6ciently. This paper differentiates between structural efficiency and level-efficiency. A cam-
paign is structurally efficient if a given volume of concessions is distributed among possible
groups of addressees in such a way that it attracts the highest possible number of additional
votes. The deduction of structural efficiency makes it necessary to interpret the concessions
as a cardinal measure. In this paper, they will be measured by the additional rents that the
beneficiaries are granted. Level-efficiency is given when a party chooses the smallest possi-
ble level of deviations that is sufficient to reach political power. Therefore the questions
posed in section 1 can be expressed as follows: First, What is the level-efficient amount of
concessions? Second, how are structurally efficient concessions distributed across voters
and interest groups? The following three sections will derive a general answer to these ques-
tions. Section 6 shows how these answers change when changes in the political landscape
occur.
3. Voters
3.1 Characteristics
3.1.1 Motivation and information of a single voter
Much has been written about the role of voters in the political contest. In the following
section, this group of political agents will be shortly characterized. The voter is assumed to
be a rational individual who tries to maximize his utility in general as when voting (Fain and
Dworkin, 1993: 284, Fiorina, 1996: 403, Jones and Hudson, 1998: 178, Blais and Young,
1999: 40). Following the theory of expressive voting, it will be assumed that the vast majority
of voters draws a positive utility from the act of voting, even though they know that their vote
will not tip the scales (e.g. Weck-Hannemann, 1996: 35-36, Brennan and Hamlin, 1998: 155-
160, Blais and Young, 1999: 43-44). This assumption is much more consistent with the em-
pirical observations than the often stated conviction that rational voters will abstain from vot-
ing (Wittman, 1995: 9-12, Fiorina, 1996: 403).
In addition, this paper does not follow the popular belief of the rationally uninformed
voter. Due to the minute effect the individual vote has on the outcome of an election, a ra-
tional voter will not spend any resources solely to collect politically relevant information.
Much of this information is, however, collected on the side while engaging in other activities
(Wittman, 1995: 9-12, Fiorina, 1996: 402-403). Politically relevant information from radio and
TV, for instance, is usually obtained while consuming these media for reasons of entertain-
ment or leisure (Wittman, 1995: 9-12, Fiorina, 1996: 403, Rudzio, 1996: 208-209). In addi-
tion, some of the information that an individual needs for his work may prove to be politically
relevant.1 Furthermore, there are a number of policy issues, where detailed knowledge of the
7latter is privately valuable (e.g. knowledge about the tax legislation, public subsidization pro-
grammes or social welfare; see Congleton, 1991: 42-43, Wittman, 1995:11-12).
In sum, the voters can and will collect politically relevant information at zero costs in
their every day life or for individual private profit. It can be assumed that this information is
sufficient to give every voter an idea of the basic ideological positions of the parties he can
vote for (e.g. Brennan and Hamlin, 1998: 156).2 In addition to that, many voters will be
roughly informed about the parties’ positions on the major political issues. Depending on the
individual situation and preferences, different voters are informed about different political
fields and to different extents.
Based on the individual information, every voter makes his voting decision. The ques-
tion whether he will vote for party A or B depends first on their political programmes. Other
things equal, a voter will vote for the party whose political programme, if put into action, pro-
vides him with a higher utility (Coughlin et al., 1990: 684-686). Second, his decision is guided
by an individual ideological bias. This bias expresses his basic predisposition to vote for a
certain party. In the following passages, a positive bias bj of voter j stands for a predisposition
to vote for party A (Coughlin et al., 1990: 685-686). Aggregating these two components leads
to the evaluation function of individual j.
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The voting decision of voter j is thus determined by the sum of the utility differential from the
political programme and his ideological bias. The latter has to be interpreted as a utility bias.
3.1.2 Structure of voters
The following section differentiates between informed and uninformed voters. Unin-
formed voters do not have sufficient politically relevant information to estimate the differ-
ences in utility that they have to expect from a political success of party A or B. Hence they
make their voting decision only on basis of their individual bias. If it is positive, an uninformed
voter votes for party A, else for party B (Grossman and Helpman, 1996: 286-269).
All uninformed voters can be aggregated to one group of nu individuals. Within this
group, the ideological bias will differ. Assuming an equal distribution of the bias between a
left margin lu and a right margin ru, the number of uninformed voters that vote for party A is
given by the following expression:
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The second group of voters, the informed voters, need to be disaggregated further.
Even though they can be assumed to have the same primary arguments in their utility func-
tions – i.e. income, prestige etc. – they may deviate in their judgement about the political
programmes. This is due to the fact that the different parts of the programme are of different
importance for their utility, depending on their individual preferences and current situation.
For some of these informed voters, their utility depends primarily on one certain point
of the political agenda (e.g. Congleton, 1991: 39-42). Such a dominant issue could be the
agricultural policy for farmers or the environmental policy for those voters who draw a high
utility from a functioning natural environment. All informed voters who base their voting deci-
sion predominantly on the same dominant issue are aggregated to become a group of so-
called dominant-issue-voters3.
A large number of groups of dominant-issue-voters can be expected to exist within a
society. Apart from these dominant-issue-voters, there are numerous informed voters who do
not base their decision primarily on one political issue. Even though there may be gradual
differences in their evaluation function, these voters will hereafter be regarded as one group.
For this group of voters as well as for every group of dominant-issue-voters, the
ideological bias is assumed to be equally distributed within the interval [li , ri]. The number of
voters within such a group i who vote for party A is given by the following expressions (Den-
zau and Munger, 1986: 93):
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3.2 Consequences for the party’s political campaigns
A glance at (3.3) reveals two basic starting points to which a political party can apply
its instruments in order to win more votes. It can either make programmatic concessions or
spent resources on campaigning. The effects of both instruments will be discussed in detail
9below. For illustrative reasons, the following passages are based on the assumption that
party A takes measures to attract additional votes while party B remains passive.
3.2.1 Programmatic concessions
Party A can change the party programme and thereby make concessions to different
groups of voters. Some of the beneficiaries who intended to vote for party B will recalculate
their utility from voting and change to party A. The concession of party A in favor of a certain
group of beneficiaries will be denoted Pi
A. The gain in utility that a single beneficiary receives
from a given Pi
A is a negative function of the number of beneficiaries, who share the addi-
tional rent.
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Assuming a constant ratio of ni to ni
ben, (3.4) can be rewritten as follows:
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The marginal number of votes that a change in Pi
A can attract in a certain group of voters is
given by the following expression:
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As (3.6) illustrates, the increase in per capita utility that a given Pi
A can bring depends on the
utility function of the voter. Due to the specific structure of their utility function, especially
dominant-issue-voters will draw a high additional utility from changes in those part of the po-
litical programmes that affect their dominant issue. Hence concessions to these groups of
voters can be expected to increase the number of votes of party A substantially.
In principal, the other informed voters also respond to changes in programme. How-
ever, the heterogeneity of this group makes it difficult for a party to gain considerable votes in
this group of voters by changing the political programme. This is due to the fact that the
beneficiaries in this group draw much lower additional utility from a given concession than
the dominant-issue-voters do. Moreover, other informed voters in this group will at the same
time draw a negative utility from the same concession. In this paper, it will be assumed the
number of votes a party can attract by making concessions to informed but non-dominant-
issue-voters is negligible.
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Though some uninformed voters may be beneficiaries of a certain concession, the
latter does not alter their voting decision. Therefore a party cannot attract extra votes by
making concessions to uniformed voters. In sum, a rational political party will restrict its con-
cessions to those points of the party programme, which represent a dominant issue for some
group of dominant-issue-voters.4
A structurally efficient distribution of concessions demands that the given amount of
concessions is distributed across all groups of voters so that the marginal gain in votes is the
same in all groups. Following the standard theory of utility in assuming diminishing utility
gains from additional concessions, every group of dominant-issue-voters will benefit to some
extent. Consequently, the higher the value of ai, that is the less widely the ideological bias is
dispersed, the more concessions a group of dominant-issue-voters will get. Apart from that,
there are no generally valid conclusions about the structurally efficient distribution of conces-
sions across different groups of dominant-issue-voters. In particular, it is impossible to de-
termine whether small or large groups will receive more concessions. The answer to this
question depends on the form of the utility function. Frequently, utility functions of the follow-
ing type can be found in the literature;
(3.7) τ1/i
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In this case, the marginal gain in votes that party A can get from a change in the concession
in favor of group i is given by the following expression:
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Hence the number of votes that can be won with a certain amount of concessions is higher,
the higher the number of dominant-issue-voters that benefit from it. Other things being equal,
a group of dominant-issue-voters will get more concessions, the more individuals it counts
(Bischoff, 2001: 159-162).
So far, this section has dealt with the – from the party’s point of view – positive as-
pects of concessions. Usually, a certain concession does not only have beneficiaries but at
the same time places a burden on other members of society, who have to pay for the con-
cession for instance via higher taxes or consumer prices. If the burden reduces the utility of
informed voters, some of them will change their voting decision. They will abstain from voting
for party A and vote for party B. In this paper it will be assumed that the sum of votes lost
among informed voters only depends on the sum of concessions and not on their distribution
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across different groups of beneficiaries. Consequently these losses in votes can be ex-
pressed as follows:
(3.9)
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where ninf = number of informed voters,
mdiv = number of groups of dominant-issue-voters.
This formula shows that the losses in votes are higher, the higher the number of informed
voters is. Note that ninf includes all informed voters, regardless of whether these are domi-
nant-issue-voters or not. At the same time, the losses are higher the smaller the disperion in
ideological bias within the informed voters.
3.2.2 Campaigning
Apart from changes in programme, a party can expect additional votes from a better
image and appearance in the public (e.g. Lott, 1991: 87-88). This can be achieved through
political campaigning (e.g. Mueller and Stratmann, 1994: 55-61).5 In the model developed
here, campaigning will lead to changes in the ideological bias of the addressees. The bias
will increase with campaigning efforts of party A and decrease if party B engages in cam-
paigning (Denzau and Munger, 1986: 92, Coughlin et al., 1990: 689, Mueller and Stratmann,
1994: 55-61). All voters – regardless of whether they are informed or uninformed – can be
addressed by party campaigns.
Hereafter, Cυ
A denotes the campaigning effort that party A makes to influence the
group of voters υ. Assuming that the dispersion of the ideological bias within this group re-
mains constant, the campaigning of party A will result in an increase in rυ. The marginal addi-
tional votes produced by Cυ
A is thus given by the following expression:
(3.10)
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As there is no rivalry in consuming the political campaigns, political campaigns are – other
things being equal – more productive the more voters they reach. Therefore a structurally
efficient campaign will try to reach as many voters as possible.
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4. Interest groups
4.1 Characteristics
Interest groups are the third type of agents in the process of political decision making
next to voters and political parties. They are founded by individuals who have a common in-
terest. The aim of an interest group is to promote the interest of the underlying group of indi-
viduals (Olson, 1965: 5-9). Depending on their common interest, different points of the politi-
cal agenda are relevant for different interest groups. By comparing these points in the two
party programmes, an interest group can identify the party, whose political programme sup-
plies their members with a higher utility. While some interest groups favor party A, others find
the political programme of party B more attractive. A rational interest group will support the
preferred party in its election campaigns (e.g. Austen-Smith, 1987: 123-125, Mueller and
Stratmann, 1994: 55-56, Daxhammer, 1995: 115). This support can take the form of cam-
paign contributions. In addition to that, interest groups can address the voters directly in their
own campaigns (e.g. Jacobsen, 1985: 7-8, Potters and Sloof, 1996). Just like the parties’
campaigns, they try to convince the voters to vote for the favored party (e.g. Schneider and
Naumann, 1982: 284-286, Bernholz and Breyer, 1994: 172-181). The total amount of support
an interest group q is willing to spend on supporting the preferred party is denoted Sq. It de-
pends on the difference in utility, that the two party programmes offer their members. The
higher the difference E [U (PRGA)] – E [U (PRGB)], the more support the favored party will
get.
4.2 Consequences for the political competition between parties
A political party can make use of this relationship in two ways. First, it can make con-
cessions to interest groups that already prefer its programme. These concessions will lead to
an increase in the support granted by the interest groups and hence in additional votes (e.g.
Denzau and Munger, 1986: 92). Second, concessions can address interest groups that favor
the other party. In this case, the additional votes will result from a decrease in support that
the addressed interest groups grant the political opponent. The votes that party A can win
from programmatic concessions to interest groups depend on the sum of campaign support
party A can attract form the Q interest groups:
(4.1) ∑
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A structurally efficient distribution of concessions on different interest groups demands that
the more votes a certain interest group can produce by campaigning, the more concessions
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will be made in favor of this group. This rule has to be followed regardless of which party the
particular interest group favors.
Concessions to interest group which support a group of dominant-issue-voters pro-
duces a double dividend. If the interest groups favors party A, they will intensify their support
in return for concessions from this party. Alternatively, the interest groups in favor of party B
reduce their efforts to support this party as a reaction to these concessions. In both cases,
party A will gain votes. These add to those votes which the concessions attract within the
group of dominant-issue-voters (see section 3.2.1). The double dividend has two conse-
quences for the structural efficiency of the concession allocation. First, a group of dominant-
issue-voters will – other things equal – get higher concessions if it is supported by an interest
group. Second, the more dominant-issue-voters an interest group represents, the more con-
cessions it will get – again other things equal.
This raises the question whether interest groups that do not promote the interest of
any dominant-issue-voters will receive any concessions at all. Keeping up the assumption of
equal vote productivity of the campaign support of all interest groups, these interest groups
should not get any concessions. Following this logic especially trade associations, whose
members are mostly firms which do not have the right to vote, should not be addressees of
the programmatic concessions. This hypothesis is heavily contradicted by real-life observa-
tions, where trade associations receive substantial concessions. The empirical evidence
suggests that these interest groups can compensate for the missing dominant-issue-voters.
Hence, for some reason, campaign support of interest groups without dominant-issue-voters
attract more votes than the support of those interest groups with such voters. This can be
explained as follows: Interest groups that promote dominant-issue-voters must use part of
their campaign support to inform these voters about the concessions. The other interest
groups can concentrate 100 % of their support on influencing large groups of voters. There-
fore a given concession results in a larger amount of resources being spent on campaigning
and hence produces more votes.
5. Equilibria of the parties’ competition
5.1 Structural efficiency
As illustrated in chapter 2, both parties try to win the election with the lowest possible
level of concessions. Hence it can be assumed that both parties follow the conditions of
structural efficiency. In sum, a structurally efficient distribution of concessions has to meet
the following requirements. Among the groups of dominant-issue-voters, the concessions
must be distributed such that the marginal vote productivity is the same in all groups. Groups
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with a larger ai and those groups whose interests are promoted by interest groups will get
more concessions. Assuming a utility function as proposed in (3.7), the larger a group of
dominant-issue-voters is, the more concessions it will receive. A certain part of the conces-
sions will be given to interest groups in exchange for campaign support. As there is no rivalry
in consuming this campaign support, it can be assumed that the support will be used to ad-
dress all voters simultaneously. Again diminishing marginal votes will be assumed. In this
case, a structurally efficient distribution of concessions is given when the marginal productiv-
ity of concessions made to interest groups equals that in every single group of dominant-
issue-voters.
Apart from gains, concessions – regardless of whether they address interest groups
or dominant-issue-voters – also produce losses in votes (see 3.9). As these losses only de-
pend on the sum of concessions but not on the addressees, their existence does not affect
the conditions for a structurally efficient distribution of concessions. If increasing losses in
votes with growing concessions are assumed, they do, however, restrict the total number of
votes that can be won by programme variations. This will be important in the next section
where the question of level-efficiency of concessions is addressed.
5.2 Level-efficiency
Level-efficiency demands that the election is won with the lowest possible sum of
concessions. Before the parties make concessions or spent resources on campaigning, party
A can expect a certain number of votes. These come from those voters whose evaluation
function delivers a positive value when substituting PRGA* and PRGB* (see (3.1)). As every
concession causes losses in utility, a rational party will try to win as many votes as possible
without having to deviate from PRGP*. First of all, party A will use its own funds for cam-
paigning. Second, the support it gets from those interest groups that favor PRGA* in compari-
son to PRGB* brings additional votes. Subtracting those votes that party B is able to attract
through own funds and interest groups’ support leads to an initial distribution of votes among
both parties. For the following analysis, this situation serves as a theoretical starting point of
the political contest.
Beyond this point, additional votes can only be attracted by granting concessions.
The question addressed in this section is what level of concessions can both parties be ex-
pected to make in their competition for the majority of votes. The answer will be given in
three steps. First, the number of votes a single party can win by isolated concessions is illus-
trated. In the next step, the effects of simultaneous political activities of both parties on the
distribution of votes is demonstrated. Finally, possible political equilibria are derived and
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analysed. In the following passage it is assumed that the concessions of party A are used in
a structurally efficient way and that party B still does not make any concessions. Then the
number of additional votes party A can get is only a function of the sum of concessions PA it
is willing to make to the M addressees (dominant-issue-voters and interest groups).
(5.1) )f(PÄV AA= , where ∑
=
=
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Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between PA the gains in votes DVA. Initially, an in-
crease in PA attracts more votes. Due to the growing losses and the diminishing gains that
concessions produce in the different target groups, the marginal number of votes decreases
with growing PA. The net gains reach a maximum of ∆VAmax at P1A. For any additional con-
cessions beyond P1
A, the losses are larger than the gains. A further increase in PA will thus
reduce ∆VA. For values of PA > P2A, party A ends up with less votes than it had at the starting
point of the contest, when it offered PRGA*. Therefore if party A is sure that the opponent will
not deviate from PRGB*, it will at most make concessions in the volume of P1
A. If the aim - i.e.
winning the election – can be achieved with less concessions, the party will choose a lower
value of PA.
Figure 1.
∆VAmax
∆VA
P
A
P2
A
P1
A
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Now it is not realistic to assume that party B will not deviate from PRGB*. Instead, it
will itself try to attract more votes by making concessions and thereby reduce the number of
votes party A can attract with a given volume of PA. As discussed in sections 3.1 and 4.1,
informed voters and interest groups base their voting decision respectively the decision
about the amount of support on the difference in utility resulting from differences in the party
programmes. Hence the decision to vote for the other party or change the level of support
depends on the difference in the changes of the party programmes – in short the difference
in concessions. If both parties make structurally efficient concessions, the net gains or losses
in votes depend on two factors. First, they depend on the difference of PA and PB. Second,
they are a function of the vote-productivity that the concessions of the parties have.
Assuming the latter to be equal6, the additional votes that party A will win and party B
will lose is given by the following expression:
(5.2) )Pf(PÄVÄV BABA −=−=
The question now is, what level of concessions can party A be expected to choose. The an-
swer depends on the number of votes party A has to attract in order to win the election. This
in turn depends on the initial distribution of votes. The latter is not determined in the model
but considered to be exogenous. Three different starting points of the parties’ competition will
be analysed here.
1) extremely uneven initial distribution of votes
If the difference in the initial number of votes between both parties is larger than
∆VAmax, the leading party will surely win the election when offering its ideal programme. As
any deviations from the latter means losses in utility for the party members, a rational party
will in this situation not make any concessions. It will thus win the election and put through its
PRGP*. Neither interest groups nor voters can force this party to change its political pro-
gramme.
2) uneven initial distribution of votes
If the initial distribution of votes is less uneven, the party with the better position is still
more likely to win the election. It can defend the lead if it anticipates the concessions of the
political opponent correctly and reacts in the suitable way. General predictions about the out-
come of the election are impossible. Both parties are, however, forced to change their pro-
gramme in favor of interest groups and dominant-issue-voters.
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3) very close initial distribution of votes
Quite often, the initial distribution of votes is very close. In these cases every party
must at least try to minimize the possible losses during the election run. As the political com-
petition is a zero-sum-game, a maxminimizer strategy can be considered rational (e.g. Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994:21-24).
In order to find out what level of PA fulfils this requirement, it is necessary to put up a
pay-off matrix. Due to missing real-life data, the following passages will illustrate the political
competition using a numerical example. Therefore let
(5.2) )2BABAA ))PP((4(16)Psign(PV −−−⋅−=∆ .
The relationship between PA and ∆VA (with PB = 0) resembles that illustrated in figure 1 with
PA1 = 4, P
A
2 = 8, and ∆VAmax = 16. The corresponding pay-off matrix is given by table 1.
Therein the maximum losses party A (B) can suffer when choosing a certain level of PA (PB)
are denoted in the last column (row). The maxminimizer strategy demands that both parties
do not make concessions that exceed 9. This guarantees that both parties will at most lose
16 votes. Any higher level of concessions can lead to larger losses. If both parties follow this
rationale, they will restrict their concessions to the area where PA < 10; PB < 10. If this re-
striction is common knowledge, concessions of 8 will reduce the maximum losses to 7 votes
and thus represent the maxminimizing solution. The situation in which PA = PB = 8 does,
however, not represent a Nash-equilibrium, because every party can win additional votes by
increasing the level of concessions to Pp = 9. On the other hand, by doing so, each party
exposes itself to the danger of losing 16 votes if the competitor reduces its concessions to
Pp = 5. Assuming that both parties have the possibility to react quickly to concessions made
by the opponent and make credible threats, it is likely that the situation in which PA = PB = 8
is chosen by both parties.
This result has some noteworthy properties. First of all, the initial distribution of votes
will remains unchanged. As both parties make identical concessions, not a single voter will
change his mind during the election race. In addition, the interest group will not support the
parties any more than they already did due to the differences in the ideal programmes
PRGP*. At the same time, however, the dominant-issue-voters and interest groups benefit
from the political competition because they receive additional rents regardless of which party
finally wins the election. Simultaneously, all other voters suffer losses compared to the start-
ing point of the political competition. It can be expected that the sum of concessions is higher
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than in case 2). From the parties’ point of view, the political competition is a prisoners’ di-
lemma, because they do not win any votes but make concessions which reduce their utility.
6. Political influence of interest groups and voters and characteristics of the political
landscape
The amount of concessions a certain interest group or group of dominant-issue-voters
gets can be interpreted as a measure for its influence on the political decision making proc-
ess. Hence this influence rises the closer the initial distribution of votes is. In this section, the
model developed above will be used to derive a number of further factors which determine to
what extent interest groups and different groups of dominant-issue-voters can force the po-
litical parties to change their programmes according to their preferences. The answer is, of
course, not an exact monetary equivalent, but expressed in categories of the model. Many of
these categories are, however, closely related to central characteristics of the political land-
scape. The percentage of informed voters and the degree of ideological polarization of the
population (expressed in ai) are two important examples for this. Thus it is possible to apply
the model to show how changes in the political landscape affect the influence that different
groups of voters and interest groups have on the process of political decision making. The
following passages will outline the effects of assorted changes.
1) changes in the distribution of the ideological bias
One possible question could be how changes in the distribution of the ideological bias
affect the political equilibrium. Here it is necessary to differentiate between changes in the
dispersion represented by 1/ai and the location, i.e. ai ri. Changes in the location solely shift
the initial distribution of votes. The effects on the outcome of the political competition thus
depends on how close the political race was before and how close it is after the change. Any
change that makes the race closer can be expected to lead to an increase in concessions.
If only the dispersion of the ideological bias is altered, the initial distribution of votes
remains unchanged. The effect on the outcome of the parties’ competition depends on
whether the changes affect all groups of voters equally. If so, the conditions for a structurally
efficient distribution of concessions remains unaltered. Solely the number of votes that the
concessions attract will decrease or increase, depending on whether ai decreases or in-
creases; hence ∆VAmax is changed, while PA2 and PA2 remain unchanged (see figure 1).
Whether the total sum of concessions is adjusted as a reaction to this change, depends on
the initial distribution of votes. If it is very close, both parties will still make concessions cor-
responding to PA2 in figure 1. If, however, one party was clearly in the lead, an increase in ai
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and thus ∆VAmax can give the other party the chance threaten the position of the leading
party. Thus it may be forced to make concessions.
In those cases where the different groups of voters are affected differently, the struc-
turally efficient distribution of concessions will change. If only dominant-issue-voters are af-
fected by the changes, the concessions will be redistributed to those groups of dominant-
issue-voters, where ai has risen and away from those groups where ai has decreased. The
impact on the total sum of concessions made during the election cannot be predicted in gen-
eral. An increase in ai in the group of informed voters raises the marginal losses due to con-
cessions and thus reduces ∆VAmax, PA1 and PA2. On the other hand, an rise in ai leads to a
higher productivity of campaigning, resulting in an increase of these three parameters.
Whether the net effect these changes have for the total level of concessions made in the
parties’ competition  is positive or negative cannot be answered in general. The increase in
productivity of campaigning will cause a rational party to give a larger share of concessions
to interest groups. This also implies that concessions will be redistributed towards those
groups of dominant-issue-voters that are represented by an interest groups and away from
the others.
If au in the group of uninformed voters increases, the vote-productivity of campaigning
increases. Hence the interest groups will get a larger, the dominant-issue-voters  a smaller
share of the concessions than before. In addition, ∆VAmax, PA1 and PA2 will grow, leading to an
increase in the total sum of concessions granted by the political parties in their struggle for
power.
2) changes in the composition of the voting population
Apart from changes in the distribution of the ideological bias, changes in the compo-
sition of the voting population can be analysed. First of all, changes in the internal structure
of the dominant-issue-voters are analysed. Assuming a utility function of the form suggested
in (3.7) changes in the size of existing groups dominant-issue-voters will result in a redirec-
tion of concessions to growing and away from shrinking groups. If a new group of dominant-
issue-voters appears, concessions will be redirected from the already existing addressees
(dominant-issue-voters and interest groups) to the new groups in order to satisfy the condi-
tions of structurally efficiency. In addition to that, ∆VAmax, PA1 and PA2 will increase. In some
cases, not only the structure but also the number of dominant-issue-voters changes. A rise in
the latter increases the number of addressees and will thus, other things equal, lead to an
increase in ∆VAmax, PA1 and PA2. An rising number of informed voters will, if they are not
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dominant-issue-voters, decrease the vote-productivity of concessions (see 3.9). Hence
∆VAmax, PA1 and PA2. will fall.
Above, two examples illustrated how the model can be applied to analyse the effects
of changes in the political landscape on the influence of voters and interest groups on the
political decision making process. Due to its flexibility, the model can be used to answer
many more questions. For instance, it can help to investigate a very heavily discussed ques-
tion in public choice theory: Does an increase in the number of interest groups lead to an
increase in their political influence, as the theory of institutional sclerosis of Mancur Olson
suggests (Olson, 1982, Gray and Lowery, 1988)? In the model developed above, an in-
creasing influence corresponds to a growing sum of concessions in favor of the interest
groups. One attempt to address this question with the model above has been made by
Bischoff (2001). Assuming a very close initial distribution of votes, he simulated a large num-
ber of possible scenarios with different parametric specifications of the model. He reaches
the conclusion that an mere increase in the number of interest groups does not increase their
influence. The sum of concessions in favor of interest groups only rises in those cases,
where the number of dominant-issue-voters supported by interest groups increases simulta-
neously (Bischoff, 2001: 200-202).
7. Conclusion
The sections above combined existing public choice approaches (especially Denzau
and Munger, 1986, Coughlin et al., 1990, Congleton, 1991, Mueller and Stratmann, 1994,
Grossman and Helpman, 1996) and added new elements in order to develop a more com-
prehensive model of the political decision making process. It differentiated between different
categories of voters and interest groups and illustrated their properties as target groups for
parties’ concessions and campaigning efforts. The purpose of the model is to investigate to
what extent interest groups and voters can influence the political decision making process.
The illustrations show that their influence depends on the characteristics of the political land-
scape and the closeness of the election race. Furthermore, the model was applied to analyse
how changes in structure of the political landscape affect the influence of interest groups and
voters. The results of these analyses can be the basis for predictions about the impact of
intertemporal changes in the political landscape on the results of the political decision making
process. In addition, they can help to explain cross-sectional differences in the political proc-
ess and its results this process between different polities.
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Notes:
1 This is especially true for civil servants (e.g. Frey and Pommerehne, 1982: 253-254)
2 A voter who does not even have enough information to differentiate between the ideological
positions of the parties can neither engage in expressive voting, nor can he expect to increase his
utility by choosing the “better” party. Such a person has no incentive to vote and thus can be expected
to abstain from voting.
3 Congleton (1991) has introduced the concept of single-issue-voting. This behavior is, how-
ever, only consistent with rationality, if the readily available data on the other issues is not sufficient to
calculate the utility differential due to these issues. This paper adopts the basic idea put forth by
Congleton (1991).
4 This does not imply that other (informed) voters cannot benefit from these concessions.
5 Due to mixed empirical results, there was a controversy in public choice literature on whether
campaigning leads to additional votes (e.g. Jacobsen, 1985, Grier, 1989, Lott, 1991, Levitt, 1994,
Coates, 1998, Palda and Palda, 1998). Especially for the incumbent this was often doubted, because
empirical results showed no significant relationship between his campaigning effort and his final num-
ber of votes. This observation can be explained as follows. If the incumbent is comfortably in the lead
and his re-election is not in danger, he will not spent too much resources on campaigning. His cam-
paigning effort will, however, be large in those cases where the political race is close. As the probabil-
ity of losing the election is higher in these cases, empirical tests may produce negative coefficients. In
this paper, it will be assumed that a party can attract additional votes through campaigning.
6 Empirical evidence shows that in the race of two individual candidates the incumbent has a
lower productivity of campaigning. This is due to the fact that he is already well-known to the voters,
while very often his opponent is not. As being known is an essential precondition for political success
(e.g. Lott, 1991: 87-88), the opponent can expect a high productivity of campaigning. In the model
developed here, the competition does not take place between individual candidates, but between po-
litical parties. These parties as well as their basic ideological position and top candidates are usually
well-known to the public. Therefore the assumption of equal productivity of campaigning is much less
problematic in the context of this model.
22
References:
Austen-Smith, D.: Interest groups, campaign contributions and probabilistic voting, in: Public
Choice 54 (1987), p.123-139.
Bernholz, P. and Breyer, F.: Grundlagen der Politischen Ökonomie, Band 2: Ökonomische
Theorie der Politik, 3. Edition, Tübingen 1994.
Bischoff, I.: Interessenverbände in der Demokratie: Verursacher rückläufiger Wachstumsra-
ten? – Eine kritische Analyse entlang des Argumentationsstrangs von Mancur
Olson, Hamburg 2001.
Blais, A. and Young, R.: Why do people vote? An experiment in rationality, in: Public Choice
99 (1999), p.39-55.
Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A.: Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium, in: Public Choice 95
(1998), p.149-175.
Bronars, S. G. and Lott, J. R.: Do campaign donations alter how a politician votes? Or, do
donors support candidates who value the same things that they do? in: Jour-
nal of Law and Economics XL (1997), p.317-350.
Coates, D.: Additional incumbent spending really can harm (at least some) incumbents: An
analysis of voter share maximation, in: Public Choice 95 (1998), p.63-87.
Congleton, R. D.: Information, special interests, and single issue voting, in: Public Choice 69
(1991), p.39-49.
Coughlin, P. J., Mueller, D. C. and Murrell, P.: Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the
Size of Government, in: Economic Inquiry XXVIII (1990), p.682-705.
Daxhammer, R.: Special Interest Groups and Economic Policy in Democratic Societies,
Frankfurt a. M. etc. 1995.
Denzau, A. T. and Munger, M. C.: Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized inter-
ests get represented, in: American Political Science Review 80 (1986), p.89-
106.
Fain, J. und Dworkin, J. B.: Determinants of voter participation: Some simulation results, in:
Public Choice 77 (1993), p.823-834.
Fiorina, M. : Voting behavior, in: Mueller, D. C.(Ed.): Perspectives on public choice. A hand-
book, Cambridge 1996, p.391-414.
Fort, R. and Bunn, D. N.: Whether one votes and how one votes, in: Public Choice 95 (1998),
p.51-62.
Frey, B. S. and Pommerehne, W. W.: How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?, in:
Public Choice 38 (1982), p.253-262.
Galeotti, G. and Breton, A.: An Economic Theory of Political Parties, in: Kyklos 39 (1986),
p.47-65.
Gray, V. and Lowery, D.: Interest Groups Politics and Economic Growth in the U.S. States,
in: American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), p.109-131.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E.: Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, in:
Review of Economic Studies 63 (1996), p.265-286.
Jacobson, G. C.: Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972-1982, in:
Public Choice 47 (1985), p.7-62.
Jones, P. and Hudson, J.: The role of political parties: an analysis based on transaction
costs, in: Public Choice 94 (1998), p.175-189.
Kalt, J. P. and Zupan, M. A.: Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politcs, in:
American Economic Review 74 (1984), p.279-300.
23
Kalt, J. P. and Zupan, M. A.: The apparent ideological behavior of legislators: Testing for
principal-agent slack in political institutions, in: Journal of Law and Economics
XXXIII (1990), p.103-131.
Klingemann, H.-D. and Volkens, A.: Struktur und Entwicklung von Wahlprogrammen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1994, in: Gabriel, O. W., Niedermayer, O.
and Stöss, R. (Eds.): Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland, Bonn 1997, p.517-
536.
Levitt, S. D.: Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effects of Campaign Spendings on
Election outcomes in the U.S. Houses, in: Journal of Political Economy 102
(1994), p.777-798.
Lott, J. R.: Doese additional campaign spendings really hurt incumbents?: The theoretical
importance of past investments in political brand name, in: Public Choice 72
(1991), p.87-97.
Mitchell, W. C. and Munger, M. C.: Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory
Survey, in: American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991), p.512-546.
Mueller, D. C. and Stratmann, T.: Informative and persuasive campaigning, in: Public Choice
81 (1994), p.55-77.
Olson, M.: The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cam-
bridge 1965.
Osborne, M. J. and Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge 1994.
Owen, G. and Grofman, B.: To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting, in: Public
Choice 42 (1984), p.311-325.
Palda, F. and Palda, K.: The impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the
French legislative elections of 1993, in: Public Choice 94 (1998), p.157-174.
Potters, J. and Sloof, R.: Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their
influence, in: European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996), p.403-443.
Rudzio, W.: Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 4. Edition, Opladen
1996.
Schneider, F. and Naumann, J.: Interest Groups in democracies - How influential are they?
An empirical examination for Switzerland, in: Public Choice 38 (1982), p.281-
303.
Schram A.: Do people care about democracy?: Comment, in: Public Choice 91 (1997), p.49-
51.
Weck-Hannemann, H.: Experimentelle Forschung zum Wahlbeteiligungsparadoxon, in:
Neck, R. and Schneider, F. (Eds.): Politik und Wirtschaft in den neunziger
Jahren. Empirische Untersuchungen zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie, Wien
1995, p.35-59.
Wittman, D. A.: The Myth of Democratic Failure. Why Political Institutions Are Efficient, Chi-
cago/London 1995.
Table 1 Pay-off matrix of party A, votes won by party A at various combinations of PA and PB
PA
PB
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 MAX
0 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 -65 -84 -110 -130 -150 16
1 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 -65 -84 -110 -130 16
2 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 -65 -84 -110 16
3 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 -65 -84 16
4 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 -65 16
5 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 -48 16
6 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 -33 16
7 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 -20 16
8 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 -9 16
9 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 0 16
10 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 7 20
11 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 12 33
12 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 15 48
13 65 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 16 65
14 84 65 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 15 84
15 110 84 65 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 12 110
16 130 110 84 65 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 7 130
17 150 130 110 84 65 48 33 20 9 0 -7 -12 -15 -16 -15 -12 -7 0 150
MIN -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -16 -20 -33 -48 -65 -84 -110 -130 -150
Bisher erschienene Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere
01/1985 J. K. Brunner, H.-G. Petersen,
Marginale Abgabenbelastung – Zur Lage in Österreich und der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland
02/1985 H.-G. Petersen
Laffer-Kurve und „Schwarze Kasse“ respektive Steuervermeidung und -hinterzie-
hung in einfachen makroökonomischen Modellen
03/1986 F. Hinterberger, K. Müller, H.-G. Petersen
„Gerechte“ Tariftypen bei alternativen Opfertheorien und Nutzenfunktionen
04/1986 M. Hüther
Entstehung und Ausbau der landesherrlichen Steuer im spätmittelalterlichen Bay-
ern. Ein Beitrag zur Finanzgeschichte
05/1986 J. Falkinger
Wachstum und Sättigung
06/1986 H.-G. Petersen
Theorie und Praxis der Alterssicherung – Stand, Ansatzpunkte für Reformen und
ihre Auswirkung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
07/1986 H.-G. Petersen
Programm- und Ergebnissammlung zu: Theorie und Praxis der Alterssicherung
08/1986 H.-G. Petersen
Mikroökonomische Simulationsmodelle zur Erhöhung der Rationalität in Steuer-
und Sozialpolitik
09/1987 F. Hinterberger, K. Müller 
Verteilungswirkungen der Einkommensteuertarifreform 1990
10/1987 A. Bohnet, M. Beck
Der Einfluß der Einkommensteuer auf Arbeitsleistung und X-Ineffizienz im Un-
ternehmen
11/1987 H.-G. Petersen
The Laffer Curve and „Illicit Cash“ in Simple Macroeconomic Models
12/1987 M. Hüther
Der Dreißigjährige Krieg als fiskalisches Problem: Lösungsversuche und ihre
Konsequenzen
13/1987 A. Bohnet, N. Penkaitis
Vergleich des Lebensstandards und der Konsumgewohnheiten zwischen der
RSFSR und den baltischen Unionsrepubliken
14/1988 H.-G. Petersen
Wer trägt die Einkommensteuerlast? Aufkommensentwicklung und Verteilungs-
wirkungen der Lohn- und Einkommensteuer 1965 – 1990
26
15/1988 F. Hinterberger
Zur Interpretation von Umverteilungsmaßen bei sich schneidenden Lorenzkurven
16/1988 S. Hermann
Ansätze zu einer Integration von Steuer- und Sozialsystem
17/1988 M. Beck, Th. Luh
Die Einkommensteuer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Darstellung ihrer Aus-
gestaltung und Analyse ausgewählter Wirkungen
18/1988 H.-G. Petersen 
Realisierungsmöglichkeiten einer umfassenden Steuer- und Sozialreform
19/1989 A. Bohnet
Die Rolle des Staates in den wirtschaftspolitischen Leitbildern des Liberalismus,
des Neoliberalismus und des Interventionismus
20/1989 G. Pöll
Ramsey-Regel und indirekte Besteuerung
21/1989 H.-G. Petersen
Internal and External Pressures to Reform the German Tax and Transfer System –
Tax Harmonization, Common Market, and Monetary Integration in a Political-
Ecomonic Perspective
22/1989 F. Hinterberger, M. Müller, H.-G. Petersen
Simulation eines Ausgabensteuersystems für die Bundesrepublick Deutschland
23/1989 M. Hüther
Probleme der Tarifgestaltung in integrierten Steuer-Transfer-Systemen
24/1989 A. Bohnet, J. Clemens
Konzepte konjunkturneutraler Haushaltsgestaltung: Darstellung und Bewertung
25/1989 F. Hinterberger
Zur Messung der Umverteilung: Eine Verallgemeinerung
26/1989 Th. Nagel
Arbeitslosigkeit und die daraus resultierende finanzielle Belastung der Arbeitslo-
senversicherung und der öffentlichen Haushalte
27/1989 K. Müller
Produktiver Konsum und Wachstum – ein Problem der Kapital- und Wachstums-
theorie
28/1989 M. Hüther, M. Müller, H.-G. Petersen, B. Schäfer
Microsimulation of Alternative Tax and Transfer Systems for the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany
29/1989 M. Hüther
Geistesgeschichtliche Ursachen für die Entstehung der Nationalökonomie: Adam
Smith, Aufklärung und Theodizee
30/1990 M. Beck
Die Effizienz staatlicher und privater Industrieunternehmen in Polen 1987 – Eine
empirische Analyse mittels einer nichtparametrischen Frontier Production Func-
tion
27
31/1990 F. Hinterberger
Entscheidungsfreiheit als Erklärungsprinzip und Wert und ihre Bedeutung für die
Ableitung wirschaftspolitischen Handlungsbedarfs
32/1990 M. Heilmann
Ein Klassiker der Finanzwissenschaft. Lorenz von Stein zum 100. Todestag am
23. September 1990
33/1990 H.-G. Petersen
Ökonomik, Ethik und Demokratie – Eine Einleitung zu einer Vorlesung an der
Handelshochschule Leipzig
34/1990 M. Hüther
Zum aktuellen Integrationsbedarf in der deutschen Steuer- und Sozialpolitik
35/1991 F. Müller, M. Beck
Versteckte Arbeitslosigkeit als wirtschaftspolitisches Problem: Definition und
Messung am Beispiel bundesdeutscher Wasserversorgungsunternehmen
36/1991 F. Hinterberger, M. Hüther
Selbstorganisation: Märkte, Staat und Institutionen. Zu Herkunft und Bedeutung
der Idee der Selbstorganisation in der Nationalökonomie
37/1991 F. Hinterberger
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen staatlicher Aktivitäten aus der Sicht neuerer ökono-
mischer Theorien privatwirtschaftlichen Verhaltens – Projektbeschreibung
38/1991 M. Hüther
Aufkommens- und Verteilungswirkungen von Grundeinkommensvorschlägen
39/1991 M. Hüther, H.-G. Petersen
Taxes and Transfers – Financing German Unification
40/1991 F. Hinterberger
Economic Self-Organization and the State
41/1992 M. Hüther
Ist die Finanzpolitik noch zu retten?
42/1992 H. Schmidt
Auswirkungen des EG-Binnenmarktes 1992 auf den Arbeitsmarkt der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland
43/1992 K. Müller
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Nutzung regenerativer Energien – das Beispiel
der Windenergie
44/1993 H.-G. Petersen
Politische Ökonomie von Nationalismus und Migration
45/1994 H.-G. Petersen
Ökonomische Theorie der Politik. Ihr Beitrag zur Überwindung der Krise der
Demokratie
46/1994 Ch. Sowada
Landwirtschaft im Systemumbruch am Beispiel Polens. Ausgewählte Probleme
aus ökonomischer Sicht
28
47/1995 K. Müller
Lean Government – Ursachen von Effizienzdefiziten, Ansatzpunkte und Voraus-
setzungen einer Effizienzsteigerung im öffentlichen Sektor
48/1997 W. Scherf
Langfristige Sicherheit der Renten – Eine sozialpolitische Illusion?
49/1997 A. Bohnet
Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland als soziales und ökonomisches Problem
50/1998 A. Bohnet, M. Schratzenstaller
Ursachen der Arbeitslosigkeit und Ansätze zur Beschäftigungspolitik
51/1998 A. Bohnet, M. Schratzenstaller
Fiskalpolitik als Instrument der makroökonomischen Stabilisierung in Marktwirt-
schaften
52/1998 Martin T. Bohl
Testing the Long-Run-Implications of the Neoclassical Stochastic Growth Mod-
ell: A Panel-Based Unit Root Investigation for West German Länder 1970-1994
53/1998 W. Scherf
Mehr Gerechtigkeit und mehr Beschäftigung durch die Einkommensteuerreform?
54/1998 W. Scherf
Einkommen, Vermögen und Verteilung aus makroökonomischer Sicht
55/1998 A. Bohnet, S. Heck
Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik nach der Vereinigung
56/2000 W. Scherf
Orientierungsgrößen und gesamtwirtschaftliche Wirkungen der Nominallohnpoli-
tik
57/2000 I. Bischoff und K. Hofmann
Rent Seeking als Classroom Game – ein Erfahrungsbericht
58/2000 I. Bischoff
Industry structure and subsidies – a contribution to the positive theory of subsidi-
zation
59/2001 W. Scherf
Das Hessen-Modell zur Reform des Länderfinanzausgleichs
60/2001 K. Hofmann und W. Scherf
Die Auswirkungen der Steuerreform 2000 auf die Gemeinden
61/2001 I. Bischoff und S. Heck
Interpersonelle Verteilungswirkungen aus dem Angebot öffentlicher haushaltsbe-
zogener Infrastruktur – eine empirische Analyse für ausgesuchte Bereiche in
Deutschland zu Beginn der 90er Jahre
